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Comments
The Change in Bank Control Act of
1978: Does It Give Rise to a Private
Cause of Action?
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky may soon witness an increased number of attempt-
ed takeovers of banks and bank holding companies. The Kentucky
General Assembly recently passed legislation enabling bank holding
companies, currently allowed to own only one bank,' to become
multibank holding companies.2 Also, in 1982, the Kentucky
Supreme Court ruled that the state's Take-Over Bids Disclosure
Act3 was unconstitutional.'
When read together, these two factors should have a twofold
effect on takeover activity in the banking field: an increased number
of takeover attempts and a reduction in the number of constraints
on such attempts. One of the important remaining constraints on
takeover attempts is the federal Change in Bank Control Act'
(C:B.C.A.), which will play an ever increasing role in unfriendly
takeover attempts. The size of its role, however, will depend upon
whether the Act creates a private cause of action and, if so, for
whom.
This Comment examines recent case law regarding the
availability of a private cause of action under the C.B.C.A. The
analysis in these cases will be compared to the United States
Ky. REv. STAT. § 287.030(3) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 H.R. 67, 1984 Reg. Sess. The Bill will enable bank holding companies, having their
principal place of business in Kentucky, to acquire control of one or more banks or bank
holding companies wherever located. The bill will also allow the formation of a one bank
holding company for the purpose of acquiring control of a bank.
KRS §§ 292.560-.630 (1981).
' See Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky's Take-Over
Bids Disclosure Act violated the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Con-
stitution because it frustrated the purpose of the Williams Act, which is to regulate tender
offers).
s 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1982).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72
Supreme Court's test for implying a cause of action under a federal
statute. The Court's test, as set out in Cort v. Ash,6 determines
whether a private cause of action can be implied under the
C.B.C.A. This Comment concludes that a private cause of action
should be implied under the C.B.C.A. for both bank shareholders
and banks.
I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The C.B.C.A. applies to all persons7 who either directly or in-
directly acquire control' of any insured bank.' Persons planning
to acquire control of an insured bank must give sixty days prior
written notice to the appropriate federal banking agency."0 The
6 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1 12 U.S.C. § 1817()(1). A "person" is defined as "an individual or a corporation,
partnership, trust, association, joint venture, pool, syndicate, sole proprietorship, unincor-
porated organization, or any other form of entity not specifically listed herein." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817()(8)(A).
- 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(1). "[C]ontrol" is defined as "the power, directly or indirectly,
to direct the management or policies of an insured bank or to vote 25 percentum or more
of any class of voting securities of an insured bank." 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(8)(B).
The regulations adopted pursuant to the Change in Bank Control Act define "control" as:
Acquisitions of Control. Under the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978,
acquisitions by a person or persons acting in concert of the power to vote
25 percent or more of a class of voting securities of an insured nonmember
bank, unless exempted, require prior notice to the Corporation. In addition,
a purchase, assignment, transfer, pledge, or other disposition of voting stock
through which any person will acquire ownership, control or the power to
vote ten percent or more of a class of voting securities will be deemed to be
an acquisition by such person of the power to direct that institution's manage-
ment or policies if: (1) the institution has issued any class of securities sub-
ject to the registration requirements of section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 781); or (2) Immediately after the transaction no
other person will own a greater proportion of that class of voting securities.
Other transactions resulting in a person's control of less than 25 percent of
a class of voting shares ... would not result in control for the purpose of
the Act.
12 C.F.R. § 303.15(a) (1979). See also 12 C.F.R. § 5.50(e)(1) (1981); 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(a)
(1979) (stating similar rules for application by the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Reserve Board, respectively).
, 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(1). The statute specifically states that the term "insured banks"
includes bank holding companies. Id.
"0 12 U.S.C. § 18176)(1). The office of the Comptroller of the Currency is the respon-
sible federal banking agency for changes in control of national banks. The Federal Reserve
Board is responsible for bank holding companies and state member banks, and the Federal
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notice must contain, inter alia, the identity of the acquiring per-
son or persons," a statement of assets and liabilities of each ac-
quiring person, 12 the terms of the proposed acquisition,' 3 the iden-
tity, source, and amount of funds to be used in the acquisition,
4
and the nature of any planned changes in the acquired bank.S If
the federal banking agency disapproves of the acquisition it must,
in writing, within the sixty-day period, inform the person requesting
approval.' In determining whether to approve or disapprove the
acquisition, the banking agency considers certain factors,' 7 in-
cluding: (1) the likelihood that the proposed acquisition would
result in a monopoly;'" (2) the probability that the acquisition
would substantially lessen competition;' and (3) the chances that
the financial condition of the acquiring person would jeopardize
the financial stability of the bank.20 Upon receipt of the disap-
proval, the acquiring party has ten days to request an agency hear-
ing on the proposed acquisition. 2' If the hearing does not satisfy
the acquiring party, the party can obtain a review of the proceeding
in the United States court of appeals for the circuit where the home
office of the bank to be acquired is located.22 Finally, the statute
sets out specific penalties which can be levied against any person
who "willfully" violates the statute or any regulations promulgated
pursuant to the C.B.C.A.23
Deposit Insurance Corporation is responsible for insured state nonmember banks. 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.50(h)(l)(i).
" 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(6)(A).
12 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(6)(B).
,3 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(6)(C).
1 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(6)(D).
" 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(6)(E). Under the regulations, notice shall not be considered
given unless information provided is responsive to every item specified in 12 U.S.C. § 1817
(j)(6)(A-E). See 12 C.F.R. § 5.50(0(2).
16 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(1). The period for disapproval may be extended for 30 days
if the banking agency, in writing, informs the person making the acquisition within the
60-day period. Id. The agency must inform the acquiring party in writing within three days
of its ultimate decision on the acquisition attempt. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(3).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(0)(7)(A-C).
12 U.S.C. § 18176)(7)(A).
12 U.S.C. § 1817G)(7)(B).
20 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(7)(C).
21 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(3).
22 12 U.S.C. § 1817j)(5).
23 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(15) ("Any person who willfully violates any provision of this
1983-841
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II. ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
A. Cases Which Imply a Private Cause of Action Under the
C.B.C.A.
The case law is evenly divided on the issue of whether a private
cause of action exists under the C.B.C.A. At least two courts have
expressly held that a private cause of action does exist under the
C.B.C.A. First, in First Alabama Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder,24
the plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from acquiring "control"
of a bank holding company because of alleged violations of the
Bank Holding Company Act25 (B.H.C.A.) and the C.B.C.A. 6 The
significance of this case lies in the court's parallel analysis of the
two acts in determining whether a private cause of action exists
under either act. 2
The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint brought under the
B.H.C.A. The language of the B.H.C.A. indicates that Congress
delegated to the Federal Reserve Board the authority to determine
whether "control" is being exercised over a holding company;
28
consequently, the court held that it had "no jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claim under the B.H.C.A."29
However, the court then held that a private cause of action did
exist under the C.B.C.A.,30 and supported its holding by a two-
pronged analysis. First, the court in First Alabama distinguished
the facts before it from those of two other cases, Whitney National
Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.3' and Orbanco, Inc.
v. Security Bank.32 These cases were cited by the defendant as sup-
subsection, or any regulation or order issued by the appropriate federal banking agency
pursuant thereto, shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per day
for each day during which such violation continues.").
24 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,015, at 91,249 (N.D. Ala.
May 1, 1981).
2 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982).
216 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,255.
27 See id. at 91,255-58.
22 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) ("It shall be unlawful, except with the prior approval
of the Board, (1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank
holding company").
2 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,255-56.
20 Id. at 91,258.
3 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
32 371 F. Supp. 125 (D. Or. 1974).
[Vol. 72
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port for dismissal because they had held that a private cause of
action did not exist under the B.H.C.A1 3 The gravamen of the
court's argument in First Alabama was that the technical and com-
plex issues facing the courts in Orbanco and Whitney National
Bank were not present in a claim under the C.B.C.A. The com-
plexity of the issues forced those latter courts to deny a private
cause of action to the plaintiffs because the issues clearly required
the expertise of the appropriate federal banking agency.
34
Therefore, the court was not compelled to dismiss plaintiff's cause
of action nor to require him to seek only administrative relief. 5
" The Court in Whitney National Bank stated:
We believe that these are the very types of questions that Congress has com-
mitted to the [Federal Reserve] Board, and we hold that the Board should
make the determination of the plan's propriety in the first instance. The sound-
ness of this conclusion is especially evident when it is remembered that the
Board has played a vital role in the development of the national banking laws,
a role which makes its views of particular benefit to the courts where ultimately
the validity of the arrangement will be tested.
379 U.S. at 421.
1, See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) at 91,257. The court in First
Alabama said:
Were this court faced with technical and complex problems in applying the
C.B.C.A. to this case, I would yield to the [Federal Reserve] Board's exper-
tise. However, unlike plaintiff's claim under the B.H.C.A., the claim under
the C.B.C.A. does not demand any such expertise nor does it involve any
discretion on the part of this court. If defendants have acquired ten percent
or more of Southland shares and if after these acquisitions, no other person
owned a greater number of these shares, then the Board's own regulation
would presume defendants have acquired control of Southland. 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.7. If defendants did not file the mandatory sixty days' notice with the
Board prior to such acquisitions and did not attain subsequent approval from
the Board, then defendants are in violation of the C.B.C.A.
Id.
The "technical and complex" issues which arise under the B.H.C.A. and require con-
sideration by the Federal Reserve Board include "the public interest, the anticompetitive
effects of the proposed transactions, and the convenience and need of the community to
be served." Orbanco, Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F. Supp. at 130.
,1 Id. ("It is for the [Federal Reserve] Board, and not this court, to decide whether
to approve the acquisitions by defendant. However, this court does have jurisdiction to
consider defendant's alleged violations of the C.B.C.A. which do not involve the Board's
discretion nor require its expertise.").
Courts have shown a tendency to overlap the concepts of private cause of action,
jurisdiction and standing, especially when dealing with an implied cause of action:
We granted certiorari to decide whether such a private cause of action can
be maintained. . . . In this Court and in the Court of Appeals the parties
have approached the question from several perspectives. The issue has been
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Second, the court in First Alabama applied the Cort v. Ash36 test37
to determine whether a private cause of action can be implied under
a federal statute. In applying the test the court held that the plain-
tiff could bring a claim under the C.B.C.A. in the federal courts.
3
Another case, Mid Continent Bancshares, Inc. v. O'Brien,3
also held that a private cause of action exists under the C.B.C.A. °
In granting the target bank holding company standing to sue for
injunctive relief under the C.B.C.A., the court relied heavily on
the holding in First Alabama."1 The court also applied, without
specific citation, the Cort v. Ash test to imply a private cause of
action in favor of the target bank holding company.42
variously stated to be whether the Amtrak Act can be read to create a private
right of action to enforce compliance with its provisions; whether a federal
district court has jurisdiction under the terms of the Act to entertain such
a suit; and whether the respondent has standing to bring such a suit....
But, however phrased, the threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak
Act or any other provision of law creates a cause of action whereby a private
party such as the respondent can enforce duties and obligations imposed by
the Act; for it is only if such a right of action exists that we need consider
whether the respondent had standing to bring the action and whether the
district court had jurisdiction to entertain it.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 455-56
(1974).
36 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The issue in Cort was whether a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel
Corp. could imply a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610 (prohibiting corpora-
tions from making expenditures in connection with federal elections) on behalf of the cor-
poration against the directors for using corporate funds in the 1972 presidential election.
The Court held that the shareholder did not have a private cause of action under § 610
to secure derivative relief for the corporation. Id. at 77-78.
" The Court in Cort formulated the following four-part test to determine whether
a private cause of action may be implied under a statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted"? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one? Third, is it consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,258.
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,734 at 93,702 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 11, 1981).
4" Id. at 93,706.
41 See id. at 93,707.
41 Id. The court in Mid-Continent stated:
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In addition to the cases which have expressly held that a private
cause of action may be implied under the C.B.C.A., at least two
courts have simply assumed, without analyzing the propriety of
such an assumption, that a plaintiff may bring a private cause of
action under the C.B.C.A. In Riggs National Bank v. Allbritton,
43
the court granted the plaintiff, a national banking association,
preliminary injunctive relief based on the C.B.C.A., even though
the court never addressed the issue of whether a private cause of
action existed under the C.B.C.A.44
Similarly, in Citizens First Bancorp, Inc. v. Herreld,45 the court
assumed jurisdiction over a cause of action based on the C.B.C.A.
In this case, however, the court denied the motion for injunctive
In enacting [the C.B.C.A.], Congress was concerned with the continued stabil-
ity of financial institutions, such as Mid-Continent, by protecting them from
acquisitions by undesirables. Indeed, one of its primary purposes was to in-
sure the safety and soundness of the target institution and the banking in-
dustry as a whole. Target bank holding companies such as Mid-Continent
are thereby among the intended beneficiaries of the Act.
Allowing target bank holding companies to seek injunctive relief under
the Act is clearly necessary to make the Act effective .... Banking regula-
tion is not an area of concern which "has been so traditionally relegated to
state law as to make it inappropriate to infer a federal cause of action."
Id. (citations omitted).
'" 516 F. Supp. 164 (D.D.C. 1981) (plaintiff national bank sought to enjoin an in-
vestment group's cash tender offer for the bank's stock).
" See id. at 181. The court noted that "because of the critical issues raised and ques-
tions presented by the Change in Bank Control Act the tender offer must be enjoined pend-
ing a trial on the merits." Id. at 182. The court further stated that, in the absence of possible
violations of the C.B.C.A., injunctive relief would not be necessary; however, the court
also said it "[w]as most concerned with the. . . issue of whether the defendant actually
complied with the Change in Bank Control Act. ... Id.
" 559 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1982). This case involved a battle between two fac-
tions of the board of directors for control of a bank. The plaintiff, Citizens First Bancorp,
Inc., was a bank holding company which owned all of the 400,000 shares of Citizens State
Bank of Owensboro stock. The individual plaintiffs were directors and stockholders of Ban-
corp. Defendants were also shareholders and directors of Bancorp. After a series of un-
successful offers in which defendants tried to purchase plaintiffs' stock in Bancorp, defend-
ants prepared a series of proxy forms and also prepared a notice of a special stockholders
meeting for the purpose of removing all directors of Bancorp. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary
injunction which would declare all proxies by defendants invalid and would prevent defend-
ants from calling a special stockholders meeting for 45 days from the date of entry. One
of the grounds advanced by plaintiffs in pursuit of the injunction was that defendants
violated the provision of the C.B.C.A. by failing to give 60 days notice prior to obtaining
control of Bancorp. Id. at 869-73.
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relief because the action showed no likelihood of success on the
merits of the case.46
The willingness of both courts to decide plaintiffs' allegations
on the merits, rather than dismissing the claim because the
C.B.C.A. does not give rise to a private cause of action, provides
further support for the contention that such a right does exist. In
fact, these cases could be understood to mean that a private cause
of action is so implicit under the C.B.C.A. that an analysis of
statutory intent is unnecessary.
B. Cases Which Deny a Private Cause of Action Under
the C.B.C.A.
At least two courts have denied the existence of a private cause
of action under the C.B.C.A. The case of Quaker City National
Bank v. Hartley"7 is particularly enlightening because, for the most
part, it is the exact opposite of First Alabama. As in First Alabama,
the court in Hartley dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action
brought under the B.H.C.A. for lack of jurisdiction.4" However,
unlike First Alabama, the Hartley court also dismissed plaintiff's
claim to injunctive relief under the C.B.C.A. The court held that
plaintiff's remedy under the Act was purely administrative. 9
The court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the court
stated that the decision in Whitney National Bank precluded any
private cause of action under the B.H.C.A., ° and could be ap-
" See id. at 873. The court declared: "We are therefore of the opinion that the plain-
tiffs have shown no likelihood of success on the merits of this contention [violation of the
C.B.C.A.] and injunctive relief under the Change in Bank Control Act will be denied."
Id. at 874.
In order to succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must meet four
standards: (1) plaintiff must show "a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success
on the merits"; (2) plaintiffs must show an "irreparable injury"; (3) plaintiff must show
whether "the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others";
and (4) plaintiff must show "whether the public interest would be served by issuing a
preliminary injunction." Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th
Cir. 1977).
" 533 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (plaintiff bank relied upon the C.B.C.A. to
sue an investment group for the group's purchase of bank stock).
" Id. at 127. "In fact the court is aware of no case in which a private cause of ac-
tion has been entertained under the Holding Act." Id.
49 Id.
O See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. at 419.
[Vol. 72
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plied with equal force to the C.B.C.A.5' The court in Hartley com-
pared the statutory language of the two acts and determined that
because of sufficient "textual similarities, [it saw] no reason why
the principles articulated in Whitney National Bank. . .should
not apply .... ,,.2 The court recognized that Whitney National
Bank was decided prior to the enactment of the C.B.C.A., but con-
tended that the lawmakers must have known of the decision and
its effect on B.H.C.A. litigation. 3 Second, as in First Alabama,
the court in Hartley applied the Cort v. Ash test and determined:
"Based on .. .the requirements outlined in Cort v. Ash, [we
decline] to follow the lead of First Alabama and [hold] instead that
no private cause of action exists under the Change in Bank Con-
trol Act of 1978."
54
Flagship Banks, Inc. v. Smathers15 also denied a plaintiff a
cause of action under the C.B.C.A.5 6 In Flagship Banks, the plain-
tiff bank brought suit under the C.B.C.A. after the Federal Reserve
Board issued an advisory opinion that permitted defendants to ac-
quire the bank.57 The court held that, under the Cort v. Ash test,
no private cause of action could be implied under the C.B.C.A.
In so holding, the court stated: "It would be inconsistent with the
legislative scheme to imply such a right, especially where, as here,
the [Federal Reserve] Board is closely monitoring the situation and
has preliminarily approved the defendant's actions.""
III. Cort v. Ash Analysis
With the current case law so evenly divided and the regulations
533 F. Supp. at 128.
52 Id. The Supreme Court in Whitney Nat'I Bank stated: "We believe Congress in-
tended for statutory proceedings before the [Federal Reserve] Board to be the sole means
by which questions as to organization or operations of a new bank by a bank holding com-
pany may be tested." 375 U.S. at 419.
" See 533 F. Supp. at 128. "Had they [the lawmakers] desired the district courts to
assume original jurisdiction in [C.B.C.A.] disputes, they could have easily circumscribed
the effects of the Supreme Court's prior announcements. Instead, they chose to frame the
statute in much the same terms as the [B.H.C.A.]." Id.
11 Id. at 129.
Is No. 81-713-Civ-EPS (S.D. Fla. July 22, 1981) (available through the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
56 Id., slip op. at 2.
57 Id.
1, Id. at 3.
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providing little guidance,59 the consideration of whether a private
cause of action exists under the C.B.C.A. centers on the Cort v.
Ash60 analysis. 61 Particular attention must be focused on the four
factors set out in Cort and how courts have applied these factors
when considering whether to imply a private cause of action under
the C.B.C.A. 62
A. The First Cort Factor
The first factor in the Cort v. Ash analysis focuses on whether
the plaintiff is a member of the class the statute was enacted to
protect.63 In analyzing this first factor, the court in First Alabama6 4
cited the House of Representatives' committee report65 issued in
conjunction with the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act 66 (of which the C.B.C.A. is a part). The com-
mittee report stated: "[S]ince financial institutions provide the
lifeblood of communities-money and credit-the public's need for
" The regulations promulgated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency are primarily designed to deal
with instances in which the C.B.C.A. comes into effect rather than what rights accrue to
private parties under the Act. See note 8 supra for the pertinent part of the regulations.
60 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
61 See note 37 supra for a statement of the Cort v. Ash analysis.
62 Arguably, the four-part Cort analysis is falling out of favor with the Supreme Court.
For example, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the
Court centered on only one question-"whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy asserted." Id. at 15-16. The Court rejected plaintiff's contention that Cort required
an examination of all four factors before dismissing the cause of action. The Court noted:
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it con-
sidered 'relevant' in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one .... [T]he first three factors discussed in
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its
purpose-are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.
Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
575-76 (1979)). For the purposes of this Comment, however, it is important to examine
all four factors because the Supreme Court usually cuts short its analysis only when it deter-
mines that Congress never intended to create a private remedy. Cf. 444 U.S. at 24.
63 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
6 First Ala. Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,015, at 91,249 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 1981).
61 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 9273.
" Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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laws to assure a safe, sound, and responsive financial system is
obvious."61 7 The court also focused on the fact that Congress was
concerned with the "continued stability of financial institutions
... by protecting them from acquisitions by undesirables."' 8 As
a result, the court concluded that target bank holding companies
"are intended beneficiaries of the [C.B.C.A.]. '" 9
The court in Hartley adopted a different approach in analyz-
ing this first factor. 70 The court stated that the C.B.C.A. was
enacted as part of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act of 1978, "whose purpose was, among other
things, to provide added protection to the public and to bank
shareholders against anticompetitive practices and insider abuses
within the banking industry." 7' The court further noted that
"nothing in the legislative history even hints that Congress meant
to benefit the banks themselves, much less to give their manage-
ment another weapon with which to defend against takeover
attempts."
72
Implicit in both courts' analysis is the notion that the
stockholders of a target financial institution are intended
beneficiaries of the statute. This conclusion seems to be supported
by the legislative history of the C.B.C.A.: "While these prohibi-
tions would, without a doubt, serve the public interest, they would
also benefit stockholders of banking institutions.... 73 The courts,
however, differ as to whether the banking institutions themselves
can be considered intended beneficiaries of the Act. While it is clear
that "insider abuse" was a strong impetus for the passage of the
legislation, 7 insider abuse alone could not have been the sole
11 H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 9281.
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,257.
9 Id. at 91,258.
See Quaker City Nat'l Bank v. Hartley, 533 F. Supp. 126, 129 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
7' Id.
72 Id.
71 H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 7; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 9279.
"1 See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 8-9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 9280-81.
The adequacy of the Nation's banking laws and the vigor of their ad-
ministration.., came into sharp question with the failure of the one billion
1983-84]
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motivating factor since federal banking agencies had known of such
activity long before the legislation was enacted. 7s Rather, the
necessity of shoring public confidence in the banking system, which
suffered greatly as a result of the adverse publicity surrounding the
"Lance affair, '"76 gave Congress the final push it needed to take
action." Consequently, the underlying objective of the Act was not
dollar U.S. National Bank of San Diego in 1973. Investigations conducted
by the Sub-Committee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Bank-
ing and Currency Committee in 1973 and 1974 revealed massive insider abuses
at this bank ...
The Committee's body of knowledge on banking and savings and loan
problems was expanded in late 1976 in field hearings conducted in Texas by
the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and In-
surance. This investigation centered on the rapid takeover and sale of banks
in the Southwest which became known as the Texas Rent-A-Bank scandal.
The insider abuses, spawned in the aftermath of these quickie and unregulated
transfers of ownership, brought down two State banks and resulted in con-
viction of a number of bank officers and directors.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 8-9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws AT 9280-81.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NaWs
at 9281.
The investigation [of U.S. National Bank of San Diego] also revealed that
the Comptroller of the Currency's office had been aware of the growing in-
sider abuses since 1962-some eleven years before the bank had closed its
doors-but failed to take definitive action.
Virtually all of the revelations of what [became] known as the "Lance
Affair" [involving massive insider abuses, see note 76 infra] covered activities
and banking problems that had been discussed, studied and investigated for
many years by the Committee and which [filled] volume after volume of
printed records.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 8-9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 9280-81.
76 Bert Lance, who later became Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
was involved in a series of massive "insider" dealings while serving as a bank officer of
the First National Bank of Calhoun and National Bank of Georgia in Atlanta, Georgia.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 9281.
Lance's dealings became a matter of national interest while he was serving as Director of
the Office of Management and Budget in the administration of Pres. Jimmy Carter. See
33 CONG. Q. ALmANAC 50-A (1977).
" See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 8-9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 9280, which states:
These revelations [surrounding the "Lance Affair"] were brought into
American homes through television and provided a cram course for millions
of families on the day-to-day activities of a bank insider.... Since financial
institutions provide the lifeblood of communities-money and credit-the
public's need for laws to assure safe, sound, and responsive financial systems
is obvious.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 9281.
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limited to controlling insider abuse, but included restoring public
confidence in the banking system as a whole.78 With the public in-
terest in mind, limiting the list of intended beneficiaries to the
stockholders alone results in an overly narrow reading of the
statute. Congress clearly had the survival and strength of the finan-
cial institutions in mind when the act was passed.7" Therefore, any
argument which seeks to exclude the financial institutions from the
Act's protection misses the mark.
B. The Second Cort Factor
The second factor in the Cort v. Ash analysis is whether there
exists any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to
create or deny a private cause of action.80 The determination of
congressional intent is really the crux of the Cort v. Ash test.' If
a prospective plaintiff fails to pass this hurdle, the case will prob-
ably be dismissed. A court which decides against the plaintiff on
this issue would have no need to evaluate the plaintiff's position
in relation to the final two Cort factors.
2
The court in Hartley noted that neither the express language
" See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 7-10; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 9279-82.
H.R. 1347 [the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act of 1978] addresses the banking problems which have become so evident
in recent years and provides the machinery to assure that financial institu-
tions live up to the promises of their charter to serve the public in a safe,
sound, and responsive manner.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 10; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 9282.
" See H.R. RaP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 9281.
80 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
I See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). "Cases subsequent to Cort have
explained that the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of
action, but the four factors specified in Cart remain the 'criteria through which this intent
could be discerned."' Id. at 293 (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)).
See also Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981).
12 Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 560.
And the parties as well as the Court of Appeals agree that the legislative history
... simply does not speak to the issue of private remedies.... At least in
such a case as this, the inquiry ends there: The question whether Congress,
either expressly or by implication, intended to create a private right of ac-
tion, has been definitely answered in the negative.
Id. at 576. See also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 287.
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in the C.B.C.A. nor the legislative history indicated congressional
intent to create a private cause of action under the Act." However,
the Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Cort have held that
Congress' failure to deal expressly with the issue of a private
remedy does not destroy an argument that a private cause of ac-
tion was intended.
84
To further support its denial of a private cause of action under
the C.B.C.A., the court in Hartley pointed out that, pursuant to
the recognized need for increased power in the hands of the federal
supervisory agencies, the Act gives the agencies various enforce-
ment tools." The court further noted: "The focus of the legisla-
tion is upon strengthening the role of the administrative agencies,
not diluting it by granting courts concurrent jurisdiction.
'8 6
Substantial case law supports the argument that given the elaborate
regulatory scheme created by the Act, Congress could not have in-
tended for courts to assume jurisdiction as well.1
7
In contrast, the court in First Alabama observed that the only
penalty available to regulatory agencies under the C.B.C.A. is a
money penalty of $10,000 per day for willful violation of the
provision." The court found this penalty of "little consolation to
" See Quaker City Nat'l Bank v. Hartley, 533 F. Supp. at 129. "Nothing in the
legislative history even hints that Congress meant to benefit the banks themselves, much
less to give their managers another weapon with which to defend against takeover attempts.
Nor does it appear that the drafters intended to create any private remedies." Id.
" See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 18 ("This
Court has held that the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not
inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available.").
13 533 F. Supp. at 129 ("As [previously noted, ... the many hearings and investiga-
tions into bank failures and banking problems have supported the need for additional and
sharper powers for the Federal supervisory agencies.") (emphasis in original). "H.R. 13471
gives the agencies four major tools: civil money penalties; improved cease-and-desist author-
ity; improved removal and suspension of insider statutes; and control over changes in control
of financial institutions." Id. (citing H.R. RaP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 17; 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 9289).
86 Id.
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 20 ("In view of
these express provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by Section 206, it is highly im-
probable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private ac-
tion."')(quoting Cannon v; University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)). See also Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 288, 289 (1929) ("When a
statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other
mode").
" See First Ala. Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEc. L.
RP. (CCH) 98,015, at 91,258 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(15)).
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the target company whose stock is continually acquired in viola-
tion of the C.B.C.A."' 9 The court's argument implies that the lack
of a right to seek injunctive relief renders the statute meaningless
if the target financial institution is an intended beneficiary of the
C.B.C.A. This argument is given further support by various
Supreme Court decisions which deal with this Cort factor. The
Court has held that the existence of a complex statutory regulatory
scheme is not a sufficient reason for denying an otherwise ap-
propriate remedy under another section of the same general
statute.9 Additionally, the Court has recognized that if the
legislative history accompanying a statute neither expressly grants
nor denies a private cause of action it will be equally void of any
language dealing with the existence of such a remedy.9' Thus, where
the statute grants a specific class of persons certain rights, a show-
ing of a specific intention to create a private remedy is
unnecessary. 92
C. The Third Cort Factor
The third factor suggested in Cort v. Ash is whether implying
a private remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
legislative scheme. 93 The court in First Alabama agreed with the
plaintiffs' argument that if the "[d]efendants may circumvent the
requirement of filing notice before controlling purchases are made,
and exercise control by voting those shares, the purpose of the
[C.B.C.A.] is completely defeated." '94 Implicit in this argument is
9 Id.
,0 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 711 ("The fact that other
provisions of a complex statutory scheme create express remedies has not been accepted
as sufficient reason for refusing to imply an otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate
section.").
" See id. at 694 ("We must recognize, however, that the legislative history of a statute
that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or
ambiguous on the question.").
92 Id. The Court concluded in Cannon:
Therefore, in situations such as the present one "in which it is clear that federal
law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show
an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose
to deny such cause of action would be controlling."
Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82) (emphasis in original).
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.




the premise that facing a fine of $10,000 a day may be a cost worth
absorbing, temporarily, to gain controlling interest in the finan-
cial institution. The court in Hartley, however, was not persuaded
by this argument. 9" It stated: "[A]dministrative remedies provid-
ed by the [C.B.C.A. are] more than 'little consolation' to persons
aggrieved under the statute. District court intervention is thus un-
necessary to effectuate the underlying purposes of the
[C.B.C.A.] ' ' 916
The Supreme Court, in cases after Cort, has interpreted this
third Cort factor as meaning that a private remedy should not be
implied when the remedy would undercut the purpose of the
statute.97 If the underlying purpose of the Act is to protect the
public from bank failure brought about by uncontrolled buying
and selling of shares in the various financial institutions,98 then the
public interest is not sufficiently served by a monetary penalty
which can be assessed by the federal banking agencies. As a result,
a private cause of action is necessary to effectuate congressional
intent.
D. The Fourth Cort Factor
The final Cort factor is whether the cause of action is one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law in an area historically the concern
of the states, thus making it inappropriate to infer a cause of ac-
tion based solely on federal law. 99 The court in First Alabama and
the court in Hartley agreed that the regulation of the banking in-
dustry "has not traditionally been relegated to state law." 10 Thus,
it appears that this factor will not affect the outcome when im-
plying a federal cause of action under the C.B.C.A.
9' See Quaker City Nat'l Bank v. Hartley, 533 F. Supp. at 129.
96 Id.
9, See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 703 ("[W]hen that remedy
is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court
is decidedly receptive to its implication under the statute.").
11 See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 9; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
at 9281.
" See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
"00 See Quaker City Nat'l Bank v. Hartley, 533 F. Supp. at 129; First Ala. Bancshares,
Inc. v. Lowder [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,015, at 91,258 (N.D.
Ala. May 1, 1981).
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CONCLUSION
The application of the Cort v. Ash analysis to First Alabama
and Hartley, the two cases which deal most thoroughly with the
issue of whether a private cause of action exists under the
C.B.C.A., leaves the impression that First Alabama is the correctly
decided case. In order to best carry out the legislative purpose "of
assuring that financial institutions live up to the promise of their
charter to serve the public in a safe, sound, and responsive
manner,'' I a private cause of action must be implied under the
statute. The Cort v. Ash analysis appears to grant the shareholders
of a target institution standing to sue, and to support such a right
in the target institution. If a private remedy is not implied to allow,
at the very least, preliminary injunctive relief, the C.B.C.A., which
on its face appears to be a bold attempt to regulate bank takeovers,
is in reality an ineffective, toothless regulation.
Kenneth L. Betts
,O, H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 65, at 10; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Am. NEWS
at 9282.9-30
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